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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PATRICIA JO MORLEY, JANICE LEE 
MORLEY, by and through MAX L. 
MORLEY, their guardian a:d litem, and 
ELISA RUTH LEON, by and through 
ALFRED LEON, her guardian a:d litem, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELBERTEEN RODBERG, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case 
No. 8738 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the record.) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On September 14, 1956, Harold B. Kesler, doing business 
as Kesler's Auto Repair, was driving a 1947 Pontiac automobile 
west on Burton Avenue in South Salt Lake City. He was ac-
companied by the owner, Elberteen Rodberg. Three infant chil-
dren, Patricia Jo Morley, age 3, Janice Lee Morley, age 2, and 
Elisa Ruth Leon, age 3, walked out onto the public street and 
were struck and injured by the automobile which Kesler was 
driving. The plaintiffs, through their fathers as guardians ad 
litem, sued both Kesler and Mrs. Rodberg. The suit was brought 
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against Kesler on the theory that he was making a roadtest at 
the direction of Mrs. Rodberg, and was her agent or servant, and 
against Mrs. Rodberg on the theory that she was the principal 
herein and on the theory that the brakes on Mrs. Rodberg's 
automobi'le were in a defective condition, which she knew or 
should have known. 
The allegations of Principal and Agent and negligence were 
denied by both Defendants. 
The jury returned a ver·dict in favor of the Defendant Mrs. 
Rodberg and against the three plaintiffs. 
The jury did find for the Plaintiffs and against the De-
fendant Kesler in the total amount of $6,523.45. 
This appeal is taken by the three plaintiffs upon the grounds 
that Kesler, the driver, was negligent, and that he was the agent 
and servant of the owner Rodberg as a matter of law and claims 
error in submitting the question of agency to the jury. Plaintiffs 
also contend that Mrs. Rodberg, because of the alleged condition 
of the brakes on her automobile, was negligent as a matter of 
law and Plaintiffs also contend that the court erroneously gave 
certain instructions and refused to give others. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This accident occurred at approximately 5:30 p.m. in the 
public street in front of 227 East Bmton Avenue when the west-
bound Pontiac automobile, driven h~- Kesler, and accompanied 
by Mrs. Rodbcrg. ran into the three children. 
Kesler owns and operates a repair shop in this vicinity. He 
had done the repair work on Mrs. Rod berg's automobile for 
the past hvo y('ars (335). On the afternoon in question, Mrs. 
Rodhcrg took her automobile to Kesler's garage because she had 
~ "miss" in tht'· engine (329). Kesler came out in front of his 
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shop where the car was parked, listened to the engine, lifted up 
the hood of the automobile, tightened a wire and the engine 
seemed to run better. However, he said, (330): 
"Well, I'll run it around the block and ~see if it runs better 
now." So Kesler got into the automobile, while Mrs. Rodberg 
waited by herself in front of the garage. Seeing Mrs. Rodberg 
standing there, Kesler then said, 
"You might as well ride around with me ·and see how it runs." 
Whereupon, Mrs. Rodberg went around to the right side, got into 
the automobile, taking the seat beside Mr. Kesler, who was 
driving. Since this was the normal course of dealing that Mrs. 
Rodberg had had with Kesler for more than two years, there was 
no discussion of a specific contract for repairs. 
Mter Kesler had driven approximately one mile, during 
which time he stopped and started the auto and used the brakes 
on two or more occasions, and slowed the automobile down and 
speeded it up, in order to road test it, the accident referred to 
occurred (331, 332). 
Kesler admitted that he did not need Mrs. Rodberg in the 
automobile to tell him when the engine was .. missing" but stated 
that (by her being present) "She can give me the idea on it" 
(406, 407). Mrs. Rodberg is a seamstress, 55 years of age, with 35 
years driving experience, who drives to and from work each 
day and takes an occasional trip in her automobile (328, 361). 
She testified that she was not familiar with the mechanical op-
eration of an automobile, and that she was .. glad that I had 
found Mr. Kesler, somebody that I felt I could depend on" to 
keep her automobile in good repair (342). 
When Mr. Kesler decided to road test the car, Mrs. Rodberg 
planned to await his return and she, as owner, at that time re-
linquished all right of control of the automobile to him. He 
subsequently invited her to ride with him while he tested it, 
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becoming, in effect, his guest. Mrs. Rodberg' s presence in the 
auto was fortuitous, and the result of a last minute impulse by 
Kesler to have her accompany him. 
Mrs. Rodberg testified that Kesler could stop the auto and 
get out, if he so desired, during any part of this road test (350). 
There is no testimony that shows Kesler was subject to the 
control and direction of Mrs. Rodberg at any time {348). 
Testimony was given at the trial that the late afternoon sun 
might have obscured Kesler's vision as he drove west on Burton 
Avenue (416). 
Mrs. Rodberg stated that when she saw the three infant 
children walk out into the road, paying no attention to the ap-
proaching auto, that she screamed to Kesler to "Watch out for 
the children". Further, that «he looked around and, you know, 'D 
I guess he was trying to find them, to see what I was hollering 
about, I don't know. But he looked around for a minute first, 
and then he applied the brakes" (341, 342). 
Defendant Kesler went to great lengths at the trial to con-
tend that defective brakes on the Rodberg automobile, at the 
time of the accident, were the sole cause of the injuries to the 
children. However, the testimony of other wimesses of Kesler's ;~-· 
comments, made by him shortly after the accident, indicate that 
he simply did not see the three infant children in time to stop, 
irregardless of the condition of the brakes on the automobile. 
Officer Laub, who investigated the mishap minutes after it 
oocurrcd, stated on direct examination that when he asked De-
fendant Kesler what had happened, that Kesler said: 
'"The light was in my eyes. The sunlight was in my eyes and 
I couldn't see them". It was only afterward, when Officer Laub 
asked Kesler how he had attempted to stop that Kesler stated 
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he had "hit" the brakes and that he had had to pump them twice 
to get them to hold. He did not state that defective brakes were 
the cause of the accident (142). 
On cross-examination, Officer Laub again testified concern-
ing Kesler's explanation of the accident as follows: 
"I think he stated that the sun was in his eyes and that he 
didn't see them, and he said that when Mrs. Rodberg called 
out to him he then put his foot, he then hit the brakes" (152). 
Mr. Faircloth, an eye witness to the accident, testified on 
direct examination that, right after the accident, Kesler jumped 
out of the auto and started up onto the lawn and said, "Oh, 
Lord, I didn't see them" (162). 
In neither instance did Kesler exclaim that the brakes 
wouldn't hold nor that the auto had struck the children because 
of defective brakes. 
Mr. Max Morley, father of the two Morley children who 
were injured, testified that he arrived home shortly after the 
children were injured and that when he asked Kesler how the 
accident ocourred, Kesler replied: 
"I didn't see them. I just couldn't stop," and he repeated it 
several times (206). 
Alfred Leon, father of the Leon child who was injured testi-
fied that Kesler came to visit him two or three days after the ac-
cident. On re-direct examination, when asked what was said by 
Kesler, Leon replied: "Well, he came over to tell us that he was 
sorry that he had hit the 'little girl, but that he didn't see them. 
He says the only thing he remembers is trying to stop and the 
next thing he knew he seen the kids fly all over" (188). 
On recross examination, Mr. Leon reiterated that he defi-
nitely remembered that Kesler said, during that visit to the Leon 
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home, that he, Kesler, did not see the children. Further, that this 
was aH he remembered Kesler saying during the visit (189). 
The same Mr. Morley, who is a mechanic also, and who 
advised the court that he was an expert on brakes stated that 
brakes, such as were on Mrs. Rodberg's automobile, would have 
braking power if the pedal could be pushed to within one inch 
of the floor, although the power might not be fully effective, 
but added, after being questioned by the court further concern-
ing effective braking pressure that there would be braking pres-
sure in such an instance, but not complete (210, 211). 
~h. Beecher, who as Kesler's witness, testified as an expert 
on brakes, and who explained several hypothetical cases of 
brages, presumed to be similar to those on the Rodberg auto, 
stated on direct examination: 
.. Brakes such as this probably wouldn't bother the driver for 
nonnal driving. He probably wouldn't know the difference. In 
normal ·stops, the brakes aren't called upon to do much work. 
TI1at is, stops that we encounter in our daily driving. Very 
seldom, at least very seldom should we have to make an emer-
gency stop and there is a decided difference in th amount of 
energ~' a set of brakes must dissipate in making an emergency 
stop and in making a controlled stop. A controlled stop would 
be like stopping for a red light, or stopping for another car 
stopped close in front of us. These brakes, I would judge, may 
be adequate under those conditions, and probably would be. 
The driver would notice no change in pedal, the brakes could 
he adjusted adequately to give a full brake pedal and under 
normal braking operations, would not notice any problem at all 
in stopping the car ... " I would say that these brakes could act 
normal under no11nal driving and under normal control fast 
\~ 
: ..... 
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stops but under an emergency stop they could show up as faulty 
brakes" ('428, 429). 
When asked whether anyone driving a car with brakes like 
those on the Rodberg auto should have known that there was 
some defect from the operation of the brakes, or with reasonable 
observation and knowledge about braking and braking condi-
tions could have ascertained that there was something wrong, 
Mr. Beecher said: 
"I would question it. In fact I would be willing to say that 
many cars are on our highways right now with brakes just like 
this and the drivers don't know it ... " ( 429). 
The same witness, when asked if these defects on the brakes 
would have been apparent if anyone had inspected the car to 
examine the brakes to see if they were all right, stated that such 
defects would nat have been apparent without removing the 
wheels (431). He added that only an adjustment of the brakes 
would show any defects, and that "None of the defects that I 
have mentioned here would be shown by brake pedal posi-
tion" (432). 
Mrs. Rodberg testified that, approximately an hour after 
the accident, Mr. Kesler, accompanied by Mrs. Rodberg, used 
her auto to take her from the scene of the accident to her home, 
and that she then drove him on to his place (339). Nothing 
seemed wrong with the brakes at that time (364). Kesler testi-
fied that, four days following the accident, the engine on Mrs. 
Rodberg's automobile wouldn't run, and that he repaired it for 
her (387). Mr. Kesler stated that on October 1st, 17 days after 
the accident, the engine on her auto quit again. After the repair 
work was finished on the engine (389, 390), Mr. Kesler checked 
the brakes extensively and notified Mrs. Rodberg that they 
should be repaired. Thi>s was the first notice Mrs. Rodberg had 
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from her garageman that the brakes needed repairs. The court 
pointed out that this was more than two weeks after the acci-
dent and, because of the time element, it was not relevant to the 
aocident of September 14 (374, 375). 
~hs. Winnie M. Lambert, a fellow employee of Mrs. Rod-
berg's, rode to and hom work with Mrs. Rodberg for several !!Jf 
months immediately prior to the mishap of September. She 19'~ 
testified that on two occasions, between September 4th and Sep-
tember 14th, 1956, while en route with Mrs. Rodberg in her 
auto, to or from work two emergency situations arose, in traffic, 
which required \Irs. Rodberg to stop her auto very suddenly, 
and that she had done so with no apparent difficulty (369). 
~Irs. Colleen Hammill, \1rs. Rodberg's daughter, testified 
that she had driven her mother's auto .. 15 or 20 times" in the 
months preceding the accident of September 14, and that she 
had never had any h·ouble with the brakes on the automobile 
(365). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
A. GARAGE 0\V~ER .\ND OPERATOR, ~IR. KESLER, 
IN DRIVING AND TESTING MRS. RODBERG'S CAR WAS 
AN INDEPENDENT CONTACTOR AS A \lATTER OF LAW 
AND NOT THE AGENT OF \IRS. RODBERG. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT \IRS. RODBERG \V.\S NOT NEGLI-
GENT IN ANY MANNER \VHATSOEVER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A GARAGE OWNER AND OPERATOR, MR. KESLER, 
IN DRIVING AND TESTING MRS. RODBERG'S CAR WAS 
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AN INDEPENDENT CONTACTOR AS A MATTER OF LAW 
AND NOT THE AGENT OF MRS. RODBE'RG. 
Plaintiffs complain that the court's refusal to give their re-
quested Instruction No. 6 was error. Thi,s complaint is ill-
founded. The court's refusal to give such requested instruction 
was proper. In fact, the instruction is not a proper statement of 
the law and it would have been reversible error for the court to 
give such instruction. 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (60) 
''The acts and omissions of an agent are, in con-
templation of law, the acts and omiss:i:ons of his princi-
pal. 
"In this connection, you are instructed that since 
the defendant Rodberg was the owner of the automobile 
and an occupant in said automobile, she is legally re-
sponsible for any negligent acts or omissions by the de-
fendant, Kesler. As a result, if you should find Kesler 
responsible to plaintiffs in accordance with these in-
structions, you must also find Rodberg responsible to 
plaintiffs and assess damages against both Kesler and 
Rodberg jointly, in accordance with these instructions." 
The portion of the requested instruction that is in italics 
shows that part of the instruction which is not the law of the 
State of Utah nor of most other states. Such does not comply 
with Fox v. Lavender, 56 P. 2d 1049, 89 Utah 115, 109 A.L.R. 
105, cited by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' own citation from the case 
shows that the strongest law in Utah, as set out in the Fox case, 
is merely a presumption of agency. However, the Fox case ex-
plains the presumptions mentioned therein as being "rebuttable" 
presumptions, and ~states that: 
" ... the burden of proving t:he ultimate fact of 
agency remains throughout with the plaintiff, ... " 
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Most of the cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their 
argument, that the mere presence of an automobile owner in the 
car being driven by another, as a matter of law, makes the owner 
the principal of the operator, are cases which do not support 
their contention. Take for example the first two cases cited by 
plaintiffs after Fox v. Lavender, supra. Anderson v. Hardman, 
313 P. 2d 459, 6 Utah 2d. 305. In this case the question of agency 
was submitted to and determined by a jury, and the court said at 
page 308 of 6 Utah 2d, 
"We think the verdict and judgment are fully sup-
ported by the evidence." 
This case did not consider the question a matter of law. 
Bell v. Jacobs (Pa.) 104 A. 587 is another case where the 
question of agency was submitted to the jury for determina-
tion and does not appear from the case nor the facts stated 
therein to have been considered by the Pennsylvania court 
as a matter of Jaw. In fact there appears no contention in 
either case that the driver of the car was an independent con-
tractor. 
In the instant case it appears from the evidence that Kesler 
was the owner and operator of a garage. He was not an em-
ployee of the garage as appears in most cases that have gone 
hefore the courts. There can be no question but what Kesler, as 
a garage owner and operator, was an independent contractor 
and remained such while out testing the automobile of a cus-
tomer who had been going to him for automobile repair services 
for more than two years. The most that could be said in plain-
tiffs' favor is that there was a presumption that Kesler remained 
an independent contractor during the test of the automobile. 
This then would make two conflicting presumptions: 
First: A presumption that the garage owner and operator 
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was presumed to remain in control of the automobile he was 
testing throughout the test. 
Second: The presumption which plaintiffs have argued in 
their brief, that Kesler was Mrs. Rodberg's agent. 
Under such circumstances the procedure most favorable to 
the plaintiffs would have been the procedure followed by the 
court to submit the question of agency to the jury. If the ques-
tion of agency or independent contractor should have been sub-
mitted to a jury, it was submitted here under proper instructions. 
However, the garage owner and operator was an inde-
pendent contractor as a matter of law, and the ins·tructions to 
the jury should have so stated. 
In Zeeb v. Bahnmaier 103 Kan. 599, 176 P. 326, 2 A.L.R. 
883, a case in which the owner of an automobile was riding 
with his son who was driving the automobile, the court said, 
"Unless some rational theory of principal and agent, 
or of master and servant, supported by substantial evi-
dence, can connect the father with the act or delict of 
the son, the father is no more liable than a stranger. 
And this principle holds true whether the father is pres-
ent or absent when the tort of the son is committed." 
In Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N.W. 336, 33 LRA 
NS 81, the owner af a car was sitting beside the ·driver, the 
driver had borrowed the car and was in complete control, the 
court gave a directed verdict in favor of the owner, and plaintiff 
appealed. The appellate court affirmed the directed verdict in 
favor of the owner in stating that an automobile is not a dan-
gerous instrumentality, and that under such circumstances there 
was no agency. In other words, the court held as a matter of 
law the driver was not the owner's agent merely because of the 
presence of the owner. 
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The facts in the case before the court show conclusively 
that Kesler, the garage owner and operator, was in control of 
the car and Mrs. Rodberg, the owner, was an invited guest to 
go along with him at his own suggestion. When he took the 
car out to test it he invited Mrs. Rodberg to go with him (348, ~m 
349). jl 
In Menge v. Manthey, 227 N.W. 938, 200 Wis. 485, a garage-
man took full charge of moving a wrecked car while the owner 
was present. It was held the garageman was an independent 
contractor and that damage caused by accident in moving the 
car was the garageman's liability and not the owner's. 
Fox v. Lavender, 56 P. 2d 1049, 89 Utah 115, 109 A.L.R. 105 
supports the contention of Mrs. Rodberg that mere ownership 
and presence in the car being driven by another, is not sufficient, 
as a matter of law, to hold the owner liable. 
In support of Mrs. Rodberg's contention that the cause of 
this accident was the failuTe of Kesler to keep a proper lookout, 
and to drive more carefully under the existing conditions, ~Irs. 
Rodberg refers to Officer Laub's testimony (143) that Kesler 
advised him shortly after the accident that he did not see the 
children until 1\lrs. RodbeTg called out to hin1. Kesler testified 
(38-!) that the sun bothered him, and he lowered the sun visor (as 
he turned west onto Burton A Yenue from Third East Street). 
Officl'r Laub testified (151) that all four wheels on the Rod-
berg car, according to the skid marks on the street, "braked" 
,,·hen Kesler engaged the brakes in an effort to stop. Officer 
Lanb, when asked b~· the court (156, 157), testified that when he 
l<~stcd the brakes on the Rodberg automobile soon ·after the ac-
cident, that the pedal took ho1d for him on the first application. 
He rcitc~rated this on being further questioned by the court. 
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Plaintiffs, in their brief, claim, without qualification, that 
Kesler was driving too fast and that the brakes on Mrs. Rod-
berg's auto were defective at the time of the accident. The rec-
ord indicates that this statement is clearly erroneous, as is point-
ed out immediately below and also on pages 6, 12, 16 and 17 of 
this brief. 
Officer Laub stated (154) that the posted speed 'limit for 
Burton Avenue, at the stte of the accident, was 25 miles per hour. 
Both Mrs. Rodberg and Kesler testified that the speed o:f 
the Rodberg auto immediately prior to the accident was 20-25 
miles per hour (352, 398). 
Mr. Beecher, the brake expert, made some statements con-
cerning the ,skid mark distances at certain given speeds of an 
auto. He stated that, at 20 miles per hour, the skid mark distance 
would be 20 feet; that at 40 miles per hour, the skid mark dis-
tance would be 80-82 feet ( 424); that at 30 miles per hour, the 
skid marks would be 45 feet (432). The evidence given by 
Officer Laub and Mr. Kesler was that the skid marks of Mrs. 
Rodberg's auto in the instant case measured 41 feet, 6 inches. 
The following cases support the contentions of Mrs. Rod-
berg: 
1. That Instruction No. 6 requested by plaintiffs is clearly 
erroneous and is not a correct statement of law. Accordingly 
was properly refused by the court; 
2. That to hold an owner-occupant of an auto liable for 
the negligence of the driver, plaintiffs have the burden of prov-
ing that the owner-occupant: 
(a) Had authority to control or direct the negligent 
driver, or 
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(b) Was actively engaged in the control and direc-
tion of the driving of .such auto. 
In Davis v. Spindler (1952) Nebraska, 56 N.W. 2d. 107, the 
court stated: 
'Where the owner as a matter of law is shown to 
be a guest therein, in the absence of evidence of reten-
tion or assumption of any right of control over the driver, 
the contributory negligence of the latter will not be im-
puted to the owner in an action to recover for his wrong-
ful death against a third person." 
In Schweidler v. Caruso (1955) Wisconsin, 69 N.W. 2d. 611, 
the owner sought damages against a third person as wen as the 
driver. The owner and a friend had started on a fishing trip 
together. The court considered that while ordinarily the owner-
ship of an auto may raise a presumption sufficient to justify an 
inference that the driver was the owner's agent, yet an owner 
may be a guest in his own auto. 1be court held there was no 
joint enterprise nor an agency relationship but rather a bailor-
bailee relation. 
In Masanz v. Farmers Mutual AutOTTWbile Insurance Co. 
(1949) \Visconsin, 40 N.\V. 2nd. 391, the owner-occupant of ~: 
a car, returning from a dance had asked a friend to do the ~:l: 
driving before the accident occurred. The court held the owner 
had not assumed the risk of the driver ·s negligence where it 
was not of such duration that the owner \vas bound either to 
oh,crvc it, and act for his own protection, or to assume any 
ri<sk. 
In Peterson v. Schneider (1951) Nebraska, 47 N.\\~. 2d. 863, 
the owner and two others were on a hunting trip and each drove 
a part of the time, pursuant to an arrangement of convience. The 
court held that where there was no evidence that the occupants 
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were on a joint enterprise or that any relationship existed be-
tween the owner and the driver which gave the owner authority 
to direct or aSJSist in the operation and management of the car, 
the driver's contributory negligence will not be imputed to the 
owner-occupant. 
In Archer v. Aristocrat Ice Cream Company (1953) Georgia 
74 S.E. 2d. 470, the co~owner, a deputy sheriff, was present in 
an automobile which the sheriff was driving. The court held that 
the driver was in complete control of its operation and the court 
held that the driver's negligence was not imputable to the deputy 
in an action against a third person. 
In Caldwell v. Miller (1943) California 141 P. 2d 745, the 
owner-occupant and the driver of the automobile were accom-
panied by girls in search of amusement when the accident oc-
curred. The court held the driver was not acting as the owner's 
"agent" so as to render the owner liable for the girls' injuries 
resulting from an accident caused by the driver. 
In Fox v. Kannisky (1942) Wisconsin, 2 N.W. 2d. 199, the 
wife, who was the owner-occupant was permitted to recover 
from a third person for injuries sustained upon proof that she 
had relinquished all right of control of the automobile to her 
husband who was driving. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT, MRS. RODBERG, WAS NOT NEG-
LIGENT IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER. 
The evidence is overwhelming that the sole proximate cause 
of plaintiffs' injuries was because Kesler drove into a bright 
sunlight without being able to see what was in the street in 
front of him. 
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An eyewitness, Faircloth (162, 163, 167, 168, 174), Mrs. 
Rodberg (341, 342, 356) and Kesler himself (384), all testified 
concerning the bright glare of the afternoon sunlight into which 
Kesler drove Mrs. Rod berg's auto, turning from south (on Third 
East) to a west direction (on Burton Ave.) while being, at the 
same time, primarily concerned with the road test which he, Kes-
ler, was making with Mrs. Rod berg's auto. Leon and Morley 
testified ( 188, 189, 206) Kesler said he did not 3ee the children. 
Officer Laub (152) a:lso testified that Kesler told him the 
same thing, concerning the sunlight, and not seeing the children, 
which the other witnesses testified to. 
The court has continually emphasized the duty imposed by 
law upon a driver to see what is in front of him for the protec-
tion, health and safety of both himself and others. Baker v. 
Savas, 172 P. 072, 52 U. 262; Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 272 P. 207, 
73 U. 1; Van Cleave v. Lynch, 166 P. 2d 244, 109 U. 149, Spack-
man v. Carson, 216 P. 2d 640, 117 U. 390, Covington,-. Carpen-
ter, 294 P. 2d 788, 4 U. 2d 378, Fretz v. Anderson, 300 P. 2d 642, 
5 U. 2d 290, Robison v. Willden, 310 P. 2d 521, 6 U. 2d 231. 
Plaintiffs complain that the oondition of the brakes did not 
comply with the statute. There is no evidence whatsoever for 
such contention. 
Officer Laub (140) further testified there were alternately 
heavy, light, and heavy brake bums of a distance of 41 feet, 6 
inches which were «All connected and definitely a part of the 
brake skid marks "·hich were left by the Yehicle at this time" 
(the time of the accident). 
Mr. Beecher testified (433) that the braking distance of an 
auto, once the brakes locked, would be the same whether it had 
good brakes or poor brakes. Al.so that a person having an auto 
with the type of brakes found on the Rodberg auto (two weeks 
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after the accident) may have no notice of the condition of the 
brakes, and certainly not under normal driving conditions ( 405, 
421, 436). 
In addition to Defendant Rodberg's objections, the court 
(374, 375), twice commented that the condition of the brakes (two 
weeks after the accident) were not relevant to the time of the 
accident, but permitted the testimony to go in. 
All of the foregoing oonclusively show that there is no evi-
dence of improper brake functioning on the Rodberg car at the 
time of the accident; that there is no evidence that Mrs. Rodberg 
knew or should have known of any improper condition of the 
brakes. Further, there is no evidence that the condition of the 
brakes p:mximately caused or contributed to any of the injuries 
complained of by plaintiffs. In fact, all of the conduct of Mrs. 
Rodberg and the condition of the brakes on her auto come within 
the orbit of Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. 
There is nothing appearing in the evidence indicating any 
negligence whatsoever on the part of Mr,s. Rodberg. Despite 
the fact there is no evidence indicating that Mrs. Rodberg might 
have been negligent in regard to the brakes, the court sub-
mitted the question to the jury with great over-emphasis upon 
the question of brakes. 
In Instruction No. 4 (34) the court said: 
"You are likewise instructed that it was Kesler's 
duty, and that of the other defendant, Rodberg, to op-
erate an automobile that had brakes that were in such 
condition tha:t they were reasonably safe for the opera-
tion of said automobile and if you find that either of 
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the defendants knew, or should have known, of any de-
fective and unsafe condition of said brakes and that they 
operated the automobile thereafter, when said brakes 
were not reasonably safe for the operation of said auto-
mobile under the circumstances, then such operation 
would be negligent." 
In Instruction No. 5 (36) the court said: 
"You are, however, instructed that if you find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Rodberg had 
defective brakes and that she knew of the same, or with 
the exercise of rasonable diligence could have ascer-
tained such fact, then she could be responsible to the 
plaintiffs without showing any relationship of principal 
and agent between her and Kesler." 
In Instruction No. 7 (39 and 40) the court said: 
«You are instructed that if you find from all the evi-
dence that defendant Kesler acted as a reasonable pru-
dent man would have acted under similar circumstances 
and if you find that the 1947 Pontiac owned by the de-
fendant Elberteen Rodberg had defective brakes and 
that the defective brakes contributed to proximately 
cause the alleged injury and damages to the plaintiffs 
and that the defendant Rodberg knew, should have 
known, or with reasonable inspection could ha\'e ascer-
tained the defective brake condition and failed to cor-
rect and repair the same and failed to advise defendant 
Kesler of said condition, he being ignorant of their con-
dition, then you must assess damages, if any, against 
tlw defendant Rodberg only and not against defendant 
Kesler. 
If, on the other hand, you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant Kesler knew, or in 
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the exercise of reasonable care should have ascertained, 
that said brakes were defective and he ~continued to 
operate the automobile under such conditions and the 
defective condition of the brakes was the proximate 
cause of his inability to stop the automobile, if such you 
find to be the fact, then you would find that the de-
fendant Kesler was negligent and your verdict in such 
instance should be against him and in favor of the plain-
tiffs. 
You are further instructed that if you find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that both Mrs. Rodberg 
and Kesler knew of the defective condition of the brakes, 
or in the exercise of reasonable care 'they could have as-
certaind that said brakes were defective and that they 
continued to operate the automobile under such condi-
tions, and if you find that the defective condition of 
the brakes was the proximate cause of the happening of 
the incident in question, then and under those circum-
stances your verdict would be in favor of the plaintiffs 
and against both defendants." 
These instructions are more favorable to the plaintiff's than 
should have been allowed. Under such circumstances plaintiffs 
have nothing to complain of in regard to the decision of the 
jury in behalf of Mrs. Rodberg. White v. Pinney 108 P. 2d 249, 
99 u. 484. 
CONOLUSION 
We respectfully submit that under the facts of the case the 
court should have determined as a matter of law that Kesler 
was an independent contractor, that Mrs. Rodberg was not liable 
for any of the damages arising out of the accident, that the dam-
ages and injuries arising from the accident occurred solely be-
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cause o£ the negligence of the defendant Kesler. That in any 
event, the instructions requested by plaintiffs, which were re-
fused, were not correct statements of the law. The instructions, 
as given by the court, actually favored plaintiffs over Mrs. Rod-
berg. The dedsion of the jury should be affirmed. 
Respectively Submitted, 
DAVIS and BAYLES 
Counsel for Respondent 
53 East 4th South St., 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
